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On the stability of cooperation structures

Haeringer, Guillaume - 2002

This paper studies the payoff structure of stable cooperation structures in link formation games. Players choose non …-cooperatively with whom they want to form a link, and the payoffs are given by the Myerson value of the cooperation structure obtained …. We characterize the class of TU-games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, which turns out to be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011596618

Allocation rules for network games

Jackson, Matthew O. - 2003

alternative network structures (not just sub-networks) can and should influence the allocation of value among players on any given …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591365

Cooperative Strategic Games — Expanded Version

Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham - 2021

The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value provides an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats against...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013242612

Chapter 5. Coalition Formation

Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 239-326). 2015

approaches to coalition formation, one based on cooperative game theory, the other based on noncooperative bargaining. Three …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025454

Dilemmas and Bargains : Autism, Theory-of-Mind, Cooperation and Fairness

Hill, Elisabeth; Sally, David F. - 2003

gain or compete for own gain and those involving bargaining and division of a surplus - in children and adults with and …-known prisoner's dilemma, are associated with mentalising ability. In contrast, generosity in bargaining tasks did not depend upon …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014085088

A value for directed communication situations

González-Arangüena, Enrique; Manuel, Conrado; Gómez, … - 2008

In this paper we introduce an extension of the model of restricted communication in cooperative games as introduced in Myerson (1977) by allowing communication links to be directed and the worth of a coalition to depend on the order in which the players enter the coalition. Therefore, we model...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011373812

Comparable axiomatizations of the Myerson value, the restricted Banzhaf value, hierarchical outcomes and the average tree solution for cycle-free graph restricted games

Brink, René van den - 2009

We consider cooperative transferable utility games, or simply TU-games, with a limited communication structure in which players can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the communication graph. A difference between the restricted Banzhaf value and the Myerson value (i.e. the Shapley...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011379462