We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set and...

For marriage markets with equal numbers of men and women and where all men find all women acceptable and all women find all men acceptable, Sasaki and Toda (1992) characterize the core by anonymity, Pareto optimality, consistency, and converse consistency. In a recent paper, Nizamogullari and...

Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate...

Channel coordination in search advertising is an important but complicated managerial decision for both manufacturers and retailers. Due to the highly concentrated market of search advertising, a manufacturer's and its retailers' ads can compete instead of complement with each other. We consider...