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I develop a game theoretic model where players use two different reasoning processes in strategic situations: cooperative and competitive. Players always consider cooperating at first: if they believe others will cooperate with enough probability, they will do so; otherwise they behave...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012924120
This paper analyzes the ability of group members to cooperate in rent-seeking in a context of between-group competition. For this purpose, we develop an infinitely repeated rent-seeking model with two groups where within-group cooperation is supported through the use of a double-edged trigger...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219131
In this paper, we analyze bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility (NTU) from a game theoretical perspective by redefining corresponding NTU-bankruptcy games in a tailor-made way. It is shown that NTU-bankruptcy games are both coalitional merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the...
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We look at the different ways of aggregating dual use products exports to give the security perception of exporter countries and their consistency with the relevant export control regimes. Also, we analyze different models of export controls highlighting the role of the perception of security,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011532016
We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535545
We analyze river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014170651