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Export controls, market structure and international coordination

García-Alonso, María del Carmen; Hartley, Keith - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001407160

Communication and Guilt in a Prisoner's Dilemma

Miettinen, Topi; Suetens, Sigrid - 2008

In this paper we measure experienced guilt in a prisoner's dilemma experiment with pre-play communication. We find that feelings of guilt only arise in the case of unilateral defection and that they are stronger when players have mutually agreed to cooperate. We also find that fining unilateral...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014220346

Chapter 54 Variations on the shapley value

Monderer, Dov; Samet, Dov - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 2055-2076). 2002

This survey captures the main contributions in the area described by the title that were published up to 1997. (Unfortunately, it does not capture all of them.) The variations that are the subject of this chapter are those axiomatically characterized solutions which are obtained by varying...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024491

Export controls, market structure and international coordination

García-Alonso, María del Carmen; Hartley, Keith - 1999

We look at the different ways of aggregating dual use products exports to give the security perception of exporter countries and their consistency with the relevant export control regimes. Also, we analyze different models of export controls highlighting the role of the perception of security,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011532016

Peaceful Agreements to Share a River

van den Brink, Rene - 2020

This paper develops a model of conflict resolution over scarce water in a trans-boundary river. In our model, we … along the river, they sequentially bargain over the surplus of water, or decide to engage in a military conflict with their … upstream neighbour. The probability of winning a military conflict is determined by a contest success function which depends on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012837891

Conditional Cooperation : Disentangling Strategic from Non-Strategic Motivations

Reuben, Ernesto - 2011

We use a novel experimental design to examine the role of reputational concerns in explaining conditional cooperation in social dilemmas. By using the strategy method in a repeated sequential prisoners' dilemma in which the probabilistic end is known, we can distinguish between strategically and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012714189

Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment

Fischbacher, Urs; Gächter, Simon; Fehr, Ernst - 2001

We study the importance of conditional cooperation in a one-shot public goods game by using a variant of the strategy-method. We find that a third of the subjects can be classified as free riders, whereas 50 percent are conditional cooperators

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014171100

Driving forces behind informal sanctions

Falk, Armin (contributor); Fehr, Ernst (contributor); … - 2005

This paper investigates the driving forces behind informal sanctions in cooperation games and the extent to which theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators' punishment is almost exclusively targeted towards the defectors but the latter also impose a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003031484

Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318436

On International Fisheries Agreements, Entry Deterrence and Ecological Uncertainty

Ellefsen, Hans; Kronbak, Lone Grønbæk; Ravn-Jonsen, Lars - Institut for Virksomhedsledelse og Økonomi, Syddansk … - 2014

From a game theoretical perspective, a prerequisite for an international fishery agreement (IFA) to be stable is that parties expect their benefits from joining the agreement to exceed the benefits from free riding on the agreement, and parties only comply with the agreement as long as this is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011095058