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Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment
Fischbacher, Urs; Gächter, Simon; Fehr, Ernst - 2001
We study the importance of conditional cooperation in a one-shot public goods game by using a variant of the strategy-method. We find that a third of the subjects can be classified as free riders, whereas 50 percent are conditional cooperators
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014171100
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Group Size Effect on Cooperation in One-Shot Social Dilemmas
Barcelo, Helene; Capraro, Valerio - 2015
Social dilemmas are central to human society. Depletion of natural resources, climate protection, security of energy supply, and workplace collaborations are all examples of social dilemmas. Since cooperative behaviour in a social dilemma is individually costly, Nash equilibrium predicts that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014146500
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Chapter 54 Variations on the shapley value
Monderer, Dov; Samet, Dov - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 2055-2076). 2002
This survey captures the main contributions in the area described by the title that were published up to 1997. (Unfortunately, it does not capture all of them.) The variations that are the subject of this chapter are those axiomatically characterized solutions which are obtained by varying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024491
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Export controls, market structure and international coordination
García-Alonso, María del Carmen; Hartley, Keith - 1999
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001407160
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Export controls, market structure and international coordination
García-Alonso, María del Carmen; Hartley, Keith - 1999
We look at the different ways of aggregating dual use products exports to give the security perception of exporter countries and their consistency with the relevant export control regimes. Also, we analyze different models of export controls highlighting the role of the perception of security,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011532016
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Driving forces behind informal sanctions
Falk, Armin (contributor); Fehr, Ernst (contributor);  … - 2005
This paper investigates the driving forces behind informal sanctions in cooperation games and the extent to which theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators' punishment is almost exclusively targeted towards the defectors but the latter also impose a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003031484
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The effect of conflict history on cooperation within and between groups : evidence from a laboratory experiment
Beekman, Goone; Cheung, Stephen L.; Levely, Ian - 2015
previously been (i) in conflict with one another, (ii) in conflict with a different group, or (iii) not previously exposed to … conflict. We model conflict using an inter-group Tullock contest, and measure its effects upon cooperation using a multi …-level public good game. We demonstrate that conflict increases cooperation within groups, while decreasing cooperation between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011318400
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Sustainable agreements on stochastic river flow
Houba, Harold; Ansink, Erik - 2013
Many water allocation agreements in transboundary river basins are inherently unstable. Due to stochastic river flow, agreements may be broken in case of drought. The objective of this paper is to analyze whether water allocation agreements can be self-enforcing, or sustainable. We do so using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224772
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The effect of conflict history on cooperation within and between groups : evidence from a laboratory experiment
Beekman, Gonne; Cheung, Stephen L.; Levely, Ian - 2014
previously been (i) in conflict with one another, (ii) in conflict with a different group, or (iii) not previously exposed to … conflict. We model conflict using an inter-group Tullock contest, and measure its effects upon cooperation using a multi …-level public good game. We demonstrate that conflict increases cooperation within groups, while decreasing cooperation between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010379230
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Reconciling the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky cooperative solutions : generalized maximands of CES form
Martins, Ana Paula - 2002
This note suggests variations to the baseline Nash cooperative solution that take into account the Kalai-Smorodinsky critique. One the one hand, a CES form of the maximand is proven to accommodate both the generalized two-person Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky - as other proportional - solutions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011512976