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Standard solutions for TU-games assign to every TU-game a payoff vector. However, if there is uncertainty about the payoff allocation then we cannot just assign a specific payoff to every player. Therefore, in this paper we introduce interval solutions for TU-games which assign to every TU-game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011735157
Minimum-cost spanning tree problems are well-known problems in the operations research literature. Some agents, located at different geographical places, want a service provided by a common supplier. Agents will be served through costly connections. Some part of the literature has focused,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503905
We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on … transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff … vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905386
-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255465
This paper investigates core stability of cooperative (TU) games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of … a cooperative game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to … reflect the core stability of the original game and vice versa. Stability of the core is then shown to be equivalent to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009366450
In cooperative games, the core is one of the most popular solution concept since it ensures coalitional rationality …. For non-balanced games however, the core is empty, and other solution concepts have to be found. We propose the use of … particular, the k-additive core proposed by Grabisch and Miranda is a general solution preserving coalitional rationality which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010641780
We show that the characterization result of the weak core correspondence in simple games in Takamiya et al. (2018 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012913496
Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of … the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012982187
allocations. When defining the core of a dynamic game, we allow the possibility for coalitions to deviate at any time and thereby … core solutions: fair core, stable core and credible core. We characterize the first two in case where the instantaneous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014171866
solution for TU-games. Existence is proved for the class of convex games. Furthermore, the core of a positive valued convex …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014173515