with a non-empty core), if a subsolution of the core satisfies [indifference with respect to dummy agents, continuity, and … consistency] or [Pareto indifference and consistency], then it coincides with the core (Theorems 1 and 2). However, we also prove … with the core whenever the core is non-empty (Theorem 3). Finally, we comment on the difficulty in obtaining further …

threshold meets the stability requirements of the core and stable sets. In addition, based on our stability study, we argue that …, and show that our method always generates a nonempty refinement of the core. We also provide an axiomatic characterization …

This paper investigates core stability of cooperative, TU games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of … a TU game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to reflect the … core stability of the original game and vice versa. Stability of the core is then shown to be equivalent to the existence …

This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is shown that the set of … core of the combined game coincides with the sum of the cores of its components. On the other hand, for non-balanced games …, the binary relation associating two component games whose combination has an empty core is not transitive. However, we …

coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the extreme core points and show a simple mechanism to compute all of them …. In this way we describe the whole core. This mechanism works from the original data array and the maximum number of … extreme core points is obtained …

In auctions with externalities, it is well-known that the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of … the sense that the seller and the bidders experience justified envy. We show that the core is nonempty if bidders cannot …

cooperative games with transferable utility. This notion is used to axiomatically characterize the core on the domain of convex … value, (b) all homothetic images of the core with the Shapley value as center of homothety and with positive ratios of …

staying with the original outcome with the risk of deviating. Employing this idea to the core leads to a new concept that we … call the risk-based core. We introduce this concept and discuss its properties. We find an inclusion relation between cores … yields many of the familiar inclusion relations as corollaries, while the inclusion of the optimistic core in the optimistic …

We show that the characterization result of the weak core correspondence in simple games in Takamiya et al. (2018 …