: (i) only eight configurations are possible for the core, which contains at most six allocations; (ii) for each core …

We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on … transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff … vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows …

We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on … transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff … vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows …

, the set of Walrasian payoff vectors of the induced coalition production economy coincides with the core of the balanced … restricted concept of a Walrasian equilibrium enables us to discuss which coalitions are formed in an equilibrium. If the …-jobbing. -- Coalition production economy ; transferable utility game ; core ; Walrasian equilibrium ; Walrasian equilibrium without double …

We consider the inner core as a solution concept for cooperative games with non- transferable utility (NTU) and its … subsets of the inner core for NTU market games and competitive payoff vectors of markets linked to the NTU market game. This … large class of closed subsets of the inner core: Given an NTU market game we construct a market depending on a given closed …

We investigate the relationship between certain subsets of the core for TU market games and competitive payoff vectors … and Shubik (1975). They remark already that their result can be extended to any closed convex subset of the core, but they … theorems of Shapley and Shubik (1975) are included as special cases. -- Market Games ; Competitive Payoffs ; Core …

strong sequential core of such an economy consists of those consumption processes where no coalition of agents wishes to … sufficient conditions for non-emptiness of the strong sequential core in stationary economies are derived, based on non …. Moreover, sufficient conditions are given under which the strong sequential core contains only time and history independent …

We investigate the relationship between certain subsets of the core for TU market games and competitive payoff vectors … and Shubik (1975). They remark already that their result can be extended to any closed convex subset of the core, but they …

incomplete information. We discuss exchange economies, cooperative Bayesian games with orthogonal coalitions, and issues of … ; Cooperative Games with Orthogonal Coalitions ; Non-Cooperative Bayesian Games …