Showing 51 - 60 of 127
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003846975
Herings et al. (2008) proposed a solution concept called the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games. We provide a characterization of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games. The characterization underlines an important difference, in terms of symmetric treatment of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012718484
In this paper we introduce two values for cooperative games with communication graph structure. For cooperative games the shapley value distributes the worth of the grand coalition amongst the players by taking into account the worths that can be obtained by any coalition of players, but does...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012855179
We introduce the two-step average tree value for transferable utility games with restricted cooperation represented by undirected communication graphs or hypergraphs. The solution can be considered as an alternative for both the average tree solution for graph games and the average tree value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012828766
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012793588
We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players in the game are able to cooperate only if they can form a network in the graph. A single-valued solution, the average tree solution, is proposed for this class of games. Given the graph structure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012723213
We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players in the game are able to cooperate only if they can form a network in the graph. A single-valued solution, the average tree solution, is proposed for this class of games. Given the graph structure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012723255
In this paper we introduce two values for cooperative games with communication graph structure. For cooperative games the shapley value distributes the worth of the grand coalition amongst the players by taking into account the worths that can be obtained by any coalition of players, but does...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012983828
We introduce a theory on marginal values and their core stability for cooperative games with arbitrary coalition structure. The theory is based on the notion of nested sets and the complex of nested sets associated to an arbitrary set system and the M-extension of a game for this set. For a set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014175740
We study transferable utility games with limited cooperation between the agents. The focus is on communication structures where the set of agents forms a circle, so that the possibilities of cooperation are represented by the connected sets of nodes of an undirected circular graph. Agents are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014177966