Saez-Marti and Weibull [4] investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's [8] bargaining model. This is how they introduce "cleverness" of players. We analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games. We show that...

We study the role of communication in repeated games with private monitoring. In such games, players receive only noisy private signals about each other's actions. For a fixed discount factor, we identify conditions under which there are equilibria with "cheap talk" that result in nearly...

This paper proposes a new communication protocol in coordination games with binary actions and Pareto-ranked equilibria, which comes from an option to delay. In the first period, players choose between committing to the risk-dominant (safe) action in the game or delaying their choices until a...

Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that repeated communication is key for stable cooperation in environments where signals about others' actions are noisy. However, empirically the exact role of communication is not well understood. We study cooperation under different monitoring...

Algorithms play an increasingly important role in economic situations. Often these situations are strategic, where the artificial intelligence may or may not be cooperative. We study the determinants and forms of algorithmic cooperation in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. We run a...

This paper studies the interaction of beliefs, payoff parameters, and the cooperation rate in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. We show formally that a player's belief about the probability of cooperation by their opponent moderates the effect of changes in the payoff parameters on...