Power indices are mappings that quantify the influence of the members of a voting body on collective decisions a priori. Their nonlinearity and discontinuity makes it difficult to compute inverse images, i.e., to determine a voting system which induces a power distribution as close as possible...

We generalize two well-known game-theoretic models by introducing multiple partners matching games, defined by a graph G = (N;E), with an integer vertex capacity function b and an edge weighting w. The set N consists of a number of players that are to form a set M is a subset of E of 2-player...

In this paper we investigate some new applications of Scarf's Lemma. First, we introduce the notion of fractional core for NTU-games, which is always nonempty by the Lemma. Stable allocation is a general solution concept for games where both the players and their possible cooperations can have...

The stable roommates problem with payments has as input a graph G(E,V) with an edge weighting w:E→R+ and the problem is to find a stable solution. A solution is a matching M with a vector pϵRV that satisfies 􂀀pu+pv=w(uv) for all uvϵM and pu=0 for all u unmatched in M. A solution is stable...

A matching game is a cooperative game (N; v) defined on a graph G = (N;E) with an edge weighting w : E → R+. The player set is N and the value of a coalition S C̱ N is defined as the maximum weight of a matching in the subgraph induced by S. First we present an O (nm+n2 log n) algorithm that...

The main objects here are Nash equilibria in spatial Cournot oligopolies when profits depend on coordinated distribution. Production is non-cooperative, but the subsequent transportation must be performed jointly to minimize costs. Cournot-Nash equilibria for this two-stage game with partial...

This paper analyzes congestion effects on network situations from a cooperative game theoretic perspective. In network situations players have to connect themselves to a source. Since we consider publicly available networks any group of players is allowed to use the entire network to establish...

In this note we consider the cooperative linear quadratic control problem. That is, the problem where a number of players, all facing a (different) linear quadratic control problem, decide to cooperate in order to optimize their performance.It is well-known, in case the performance criteria are...

The nucleolus offers a desirable payoff-sharing solution in cooperative games, thanks to its attractive properties. Although computing the nucleolus is very challenging, the Kohlberg criterion offers a method for verifying whether a solution is the nucleolus in relatively small games (number of...

Existing cooperative game theoretic studies of bargaining power in gas pipeline systems are based on the so called characteristic function form (CFF). This approach is potentially misleading if some pipelines fall under regulated third party access (TPA). TPA, which is by now the norm in the EU,...