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We consider the model of cooperative games in which the agents can restrict the communication, because agents are sometimes divided into subgroups in a natural way, for example by their political affinities or by the companies that employ them. More particularly we focus on cooperative games...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999560
We consider the model of cooperative games in which the agents can restrict the communication, because agents are sometimes divided into subgroups in a natural way, for example by their political affinities or by the companies that employ them. More particularly we focus on cooperative games...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847513
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371489
We provide a new characterization of the weighted Banzhaf value derived from some postulates in a recent paper by Radzik, Nowak and Driessen [7]. Our approach owes much to the work by Lehrer [4] on the classical Banzhaf value based on the idea of amalgamation of pairs of players and an induction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755747
We use the Shapley value and the nucleolus to analyze the impact of three controversial pipeline projects on the power structure in the Eurasian trade of natural gas. Two pipelines, `Nord Stream' and `South Stream', allow Russian gas to bypass transit countries, Ukraine and Belarus. The third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010490647
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012591527
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011982747
We have studied the incentives of forming coalitions in the Airport Problem. It has shown that in this class of games, if coalitions form freely, the Shapley value does not lead to the formation of grand or coalitions with many players. Just a coalition with a few number of players forms to act...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272565
We have studied the incentives of forming coalitions in the Airport Problem. It has shown that in this class of games, if coalitions form freely, the Shapley value does not lead to the formation of grand or coalitions with many players. Just a coalition with a few number of players forms to act...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009452562
A growing number of major natural gas markets in the world have adopted the gas-on-gas competition, or are in the phase of transition to this price formation mechanism. In this situation, China has also started to reform the pricing mechanism by establishing gas trading centers in Shanghai and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012652402