This paper studies an evolutionary model of network formation with endogenous decay, in which agents benefit both from direct and indirect connections. In addition to forming (costly) links, agents choose actions for a coordination game that determines the level of decay of each link. We address...

This paper studies an evolutionary model of network formation with endogenous decay, in which agents benefit both from direct and indirect connections. In addition to forming (costly) links, agents choose actions for a coordination game that determines the level of decay of each link. We address...

We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2x2 - coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We find that a payoff dominant convention is selected for a wider parameter range when agents may only...

We study a coordination game among agents on a network, who choose whether or not to take an action in an uncertain environment that yields value increasing in the actions of neighbors. We develop an algorithm that fully characterizes the equilibrium partitions (coordination sets) and thresholds...

We examine different populations' play in coordination games in online experiments with over a thousand subjects. Subjects played a two-player coordination game that had multiple equilibria: two equilibria with highly asymmetric payoffs and another equilibrium with symmetric payoffs but a...

e study whether maximum efficiency can be obtained in a stochastic learning model where players can actively form links with a limited number of peers to play a size-dependent minimum-effort game. The long-run equilibrium is contingent on the linking constraint and the marginal payoff from...

This paper studies an evolutionary model of network formation with endogenous decay, in which agents benefit both from direct and indirect connections. In addition to forming (costly) links, agents choose actions for a coordination game that determines the level of decay of each link. We address...

This paper experimentally analyzes the effect of network structures on individualsʼ decisions in a game of strategic substitutes. The theoretical basis for our experiment is the model of Bramoullé and Kranton (2007). As predicted, we find that individuals are able to coordinate on equilibria,...

We study a coordination game in a network that indicates who plays with whom. A player chooses a strategy by logit choice. We show that in typical scale-free networks, one strategy always prevails by the neighborhood effect regardless of the values of parameters, while in regular networks, it...

We experimentally investigate group effort-coordination games where individuals are occasionally offered opportunities to alter their interaction neighborhood (with whom they want to connect and interact). We vary the neighborhood flexibility, or the rate with which such opportunities arise. We...