Showing 1 - 9 of 9
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003269933
Players coordinate continuation play in repeated games with public monitoring. This paper asks the robustness of such equilibrium play with respect to private monitoring perturbations that are ex-ante close to the public-monitoring structure. We show that, in two-player games with full support...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013092729
This paper analyzes pricing decisions and competition in network markets, assuming that groups of consumers can coordinate their choices when it is in their interest, if coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003441183
This paper shows that asynchronicity of moves can lead to a unique prediction in coordination games, in an infinite-horizon setting, under certain conditions on off-equilibrium payoffs. In two-player games we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for play ultimately being absorbed in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010510706
This paper assumes that groups of consumers in network markets can coordinate their choices when it is in their best interest to do so, and when coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium if consumers have heterogeneous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002484326
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002396012
This paper assumes that groups of consumers in network markets can coordinate their choices when it is in their best interest to do so, and when coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium if consumers have heterogeneous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002521214
This paper analyzes pricing decisions and competition in network markets, assuming that groups of consumers can coordinate their choices when it is in their interest, if coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318906
This paper assumes that groups of consumers in network markets can coordinate their choices when it is in their best interest to do so, and when coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium if consumers have heterogeneous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014069014