In this experiment groups of 8 subjects are recruited into the lab and play Van Huyck et al.'s (1990) Minimum Game for 10 periods. After his participation is over each subject is replaced by another agent, his laboratory descendant, who then plays the game for another 10 periods with a fresh...

This paper reports on an experiment testing Credible Message Rationalizability (CMR) in one-shot and repeated signaling games with costless communication. CMR is a non-equilibrium theory combining rationalizability with the idea that players will, using the natural meaning of the language,...

We build on Van Huyck, Gillette and Battalio (1992) and examine the efficacy of credible assignments in a stag-hunt type coordination game with two Pareto-ranked equilibria, one payoff dominant and the other risk dominant. The majority of our subjects fail to coordinate to the payoff dominant...

We build on Van Huyck, Gillette and Battalio (1992) and examine the efficacy of credible assignments in a stag-hunt type coordination game with two Pareto-ranked equilibria, one payoff dominant and the other risk dominant. The majority of our subjects fail to coordinate to the payoff dominant...