Showing 1 - 10 of 11
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009790484
Collaboration in teams in which each member's output is critical to the overall success present organizations with difficult coordination problems. We develop a model and run simulations to analyze how costly communication affects team coordination and output efficiency. We show that absent any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208672
Why are coordination problems common when public sector organizations share responsibilities, and what can be done to mitigate such problems? This paper uses a multi-task principal-agent model to examine two related reasons: the incentives to coordinate resource allocation and the difficulties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013053353
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010237674
Team collaborations in which each member's output is critical to the overall success present organizations with difficult coordination problems. Despite the need for communication in such situations, team members often fail to share essential information. To examine why team communication and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013299407
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013383250
This paper explores experimentally the effects of costly communication possibilities in market entry games. It is shown that these effects depend on whether entry costs are symmetric or asymmetric. In the former, but not the latter case, communication possibilities increase coordination success...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645111
The main purpose of this paper is to suggest a mechanism of coordination whereby concerns for high relative position might evolve endogenously. A simple symmetric 2 × 2 strategic coordination game is analyzed in an evolutionary environment where continua of bounded rational agents are randomly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645187
We analyze a cooperation game and a coordination game in an evolutionary environment. Agents make noisy observations of opponent's propensity to play dove, called reputation, and form preferences over opponents based on their reputation. A game takes place when two agents agree to play. Socially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645192
This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds strong indications of such free-riding. Firstly, the subjects tend to wait for others to send a message when communication is costly, which does not happen when communication is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008548988