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Within-team competition in the minimum effort coordination game

Fatas, Enrique; Neugebauer, Tibor; Perote, Javier - In: Pacific economic review 11 (2006) 2, pp. 247-266

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003351942

Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David J.; Fatas, Enrique - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 10 (2007) 3, pp. 269-284

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003608174

Step thinking and costly coordination

Fatas, Enrique; Morales, Antonio J. - In: Economics letters 120 (2013) 2, pp. 181-183

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010127795

Stand by me : experiments on help and commitment in coordination games

Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David J.; Fatas, Enrique; Qi, Shi - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 62 (2016) 10, pp. 2916-2936

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591794

Leadership and Overcoming Coordination Failure with Asymmetric Costs

Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David J.; Fatas, Enrique - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006

We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547446

Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David; Fatas, Enrique - In: Experimental Economics 10 (2007) 3, pp. 269-284

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005711657

Leadership and Overcoming Coordination Failure with Asymmetric Costs

Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David J.; Fatas, Enrique - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572147