A simple symmetric 2 "e 2 strategic coordination game is analyzed in an evolutionary environment under the assumption that agents are able to condition their actions on observations made of the opponent. Agents are assumed to be associated with a profile of characteristics, of which all agents...

We study the design of public information structures that maximize the probability of selecting a Pareto dominant equilibrium in symmetric (2 x 2) coordination games. Because the need to coordinate exposes players to strategic risk, we treat the designer as able to implement an equilibrium only...

We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered unrelated. M equilibrium is empirically robust and,...

This study focuses on discovered versions of coordination games with unawareness, and proposes a novel solution concept under unawareness named a successful-coordination equilibrium. In games with unawareness, coordination might fail because the models assume that agents are unaware of their...

A simple symmetric 2 „e 2 strategic coordination game is analyzed in an evolutionary environment under the assumption that agents are able to condition their actions on observations made of the opponent. Agents are assumed to be associated with a profile of characteristics, of which all agents...

The main purpose of this paper is to suggest a mechanism of coordination whereby concerns for high relative position might evolve endogenously. A simple symmetric 2 × 2 strategic coordination game is analyzed in an evolutionary environment where continua of bounded rational agents are randomly...

We analyze a cooperation game and a coordination game in an evolutionary environment. Agents make noisy observations of opponent's propensity to play dove, called reputation, and form preferences over opponents based on their reputation. A game takes place when two agents agree to play. Socially...

Turn taking is observed in many field and laboratory settings. We study when and how turn taking can be supported as an equilibrium outcome in a class of repeated games, where the stage game is a symmetric two-player mixed-interest game with asymmetric joint-payoff-maximizing outcomes that may...

Under what conditions can cooperation be sustained in a network of strangers? Here we study the role of institutions and uncover a new behavioral foundation for the use of monetary systems.In an experiment, anonymous subjects could cooperate or defect in bilateral random encounters. This...

A growing body of experimental research documents that nonmonetary sanctions and rewards may be important instruments for enforcing efficient behavior. This study contributes to this literature by reporting results from a laboratory experiment. The experiment is designed to test whether...