Horizontal shareholdings exist when a common set of investors own significant shares in corporations that are horizontal competitors in a product market. Economic models show that substantial horizontal shareholdings are likely to anticompetitively raise prices when the owned businesses compete...

Although empirical studies show that common shareholding affects corporate conduct and that common horizontal shareholding lessens competition, critics have argued that the law should not take any action until we have clearer proof on the causal mechanisms. I show that we actually have ample...

An intense academic debate has arisen recently concerning the crucial bedrock that underpins a corporate governance regime where widely-held public companies dominate. In the discourse, little has been said about the contribution of merger activity. The paper seeks to address this gap by...

This paper proposes a model of corporate control and oligopolistic competition under common ownership. Each firm’s conduct results from Nash bargaining (NB) among shareholders and firms play a Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains. NB encompasses a rich class of models of corporate control under...

Sales restrictions through online marketplaces (or online marketplace restrictions) have recently been an important topic within the context of the Turkish competition law. Within this scope, the legislative works concerning online marketplace restrictions in Turkey bears a significant...

We analyze horizontal mergers when the acquirer holds a passive partial ownership stake (PPO) in the target firm prior to the merger. We show that a PPO reduces the minimal synergy level necessary to make a merger beneficial for consumers. It follows that an antitrust authority ignoring existing...

A fast-growing legal literature commenting on a set of empirical papers alleging anticompetitive effects of common ownership claims that the reported effects, if true, would imply that corporate executives violate their fiduciary duty: whereas acting in the interest of common owners can help...

A growing number of policymakers and scholars are calling for tougher rules to curb corporate acquisitions. But these appeals are premature. There is currently little evidence to suggest that mergers systematically harm consumer welfare. More importantly, scholars fail to identify alternative...

Corporatism is often seen as the way Swiss stakeholders in business and politics are handling industrial challenges in a reasonable and flexible way. The following paper argues, however, that the emergence of corporatist structures in the Swiss watch industry has often encouraged rent-seeking...

Cartel detection has been an important part of antitrust scholarship and policy for some time. Most of the development of the literature on cartel detection has focused at the firm level. This should not be surprising since industrial organization studies firms and markets. Antitrust scholarship...