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Family business governance and outside directors : expectations from an independent director
Gallo, Miguel Ángel - In: European journal of family business 13 (2023) 1, pp. 126-130
Based on the author's own experience as an external and independent director of several boards of directors of family-owned companies, the objective of this paper is to show the responsibilities that these directors must assume and how they should preserve their qualities as "external" and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014506625
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Opaque Networks: Business and community in the Isle of Man, 1840-1900
Crumplin, Tim - In: Business History 49 (2007) 6, pp. 780-801
network life cycle are considered. Market manipulation, the importance of monitoring in instances of unsophisticated …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009222406
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Monitoring to Reduce Agency Costs: Examining the Behavior of Independent and Non-Independent Boards
Milne, Frank; Purda, Lynnette; Anand, Anita - Economics Department, Queen's University - 2010
Berle and Means's analysis of the corporation--in particular, their view that those in control are not the owners of the corporation--raises questions about actions that corporations take to counter concerns regarding management's influence. What mechanisms, if any, do corporations implement to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671792
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Ownership concentration, monitoring and optimal board structure
Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - 2005
charge of project selection and the supervisory board is in charge of monitoring. We consider the case in which the large …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261334
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No derivative shareholder suits in Europe: A model of percentage limits and collusion
Grechenig, Kristoffel; Sekyra, Michael - 2010
We address one of the cardinal puzzles of European corporate law: the lack of derivate share-holder suits. We explain this phenomenon on the basis of percentage limits which require share-holders to hold a minimum amount of shares in order to bring a lawsuit. We show that, under this legal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270439
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Optimal delegation when the large shareholder has multiple tasks
Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - 2010
gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project … choice. Optimality would require a large ownership stake for monitoring but a small stake for not interfering with managerial …. The large shareholder retains full ownership of the firm but monitoring, and the resulting firing policy, are distorted …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270637
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Ownership concentration, monitoring, and optimal board structure
Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - In: Economics Bulletin 32 (2012) 4, pp. 3333-3346
the board. The board has two tasks: project selection and monitoring the ability of the manager. In a one-tier structure … supervisory board is in charge of monitoring. We show that such a two-tier structure can limit interference from the large … the large shareholder's incentive for monitoring. This results in higher expected profits. If the increase in profits is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278523
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The Allocation and Monitoring Role of Capital Markets: Theory and International Evidence
Tadesse, Solomon - 2003
information production and monitoring. I argue that the governance function has more impact on the efficiency with which resources …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009476803
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The Allocation and Monitoring Role of Capital Markets: Theory and International Evidence
Tadesse, Solomon - 2003
information production and monitoring. I argue that the governance function has more impact on the efficiency with which resources …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009476906
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Monitoring to reduce agency costs: Examining the behavior of independent and non-independent boards
Anand, Anita; Milne, Frank; Purda, Lynnette - 2010
Berle and Means's analysis of the corporation - in particular, their view that those in control are not the owners of the corporation - raises questions about actions that corporations take to counter concerns regarding management's influence. What mechanisms, if any, do corporations implement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010290449