In dieser Studie wurde untersucht, welchen Einfluß die Veränderungen der Rahmenbedingungen für die industrielle Fertigung in den 1990-er Jahren auf die Struktur des verarbeitenden Gewerbes und die strategische Ausrichtung der Unternehmen hatten. Insbesondere sollten Wirkungsbeziehungen...

Many observers consider the most important responsibility of the board of directors its responsibility to hire and fire the CEO. To this end, an interesting situation arises when a CEO resigns and the board chooses neither an internal nor external candidate, but a current board member as...

We are concerned with the design of a constitution for a firm - an ex ante contract which assigns residual rights of control (and possibly residual income rights) without reference to the issue to be decided. We focus attention on two polar constitutions: non-profit cooperatives and outside...

The present paper reveals that an investor's investment decision is based on the internal as well as external factors. Corporate governance is an external factor at the same time human psychology acts as an internal factor in the investment decision. The corporate governance plays an important...

In Japan, since 2013, Japanese corporate governance reform has been developed by Japanese Government initiatives. This paper provides a theoretical framework for understanding what Japanese corporate governance reform means for Japanese companies by an application of agency theory. Corporate...

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are present in key sectors of the economies around the world. While they can provide an important public service, there is widespread concern that their activities are negatively affected by corruption. However, there is limited cross-country analysis on the costs...

We argue that the stakeholder and CSR literatures can benefit from more systematic thinking about ownership. We discuss general notions of ownership in economics and law and the entrepreneurial notion of ownership we have developed in prior work. On this basis, we argue that stakeholder theory...

The optimal view of managerial power theory suggests that corporate boards reward CEOs with power for good firm performance as the boards' assessment of their ability is higher. In evaluating the CEO's quality, economic theory predicts that boards filter out luck from performance. Luck...

Board evaluation can provide a vital tool for directors to review and improve their performance. This will eventually lead to significant value creation opportunities for firms. But is increased regulation and regulatory guidance requiring board evaluation a realistic or sensible move? Is it...

The problem of managerial agency costs dominates debates in corporate law. Many leading scholars advocate reforms that would reduce agency costs by forcing firms to allocate more control to shareholders. Such proposals disregard the costs that shareholders avoid by delegating control to managers...