We examine how friendly boards affect firm innovation. Using CEO-director social connections as a measure of board friendliness, we find that firms with friendly boards create more patents and citations. The positive relation between friendly boards and innovation are more pronounced when firms'...

We examine whether outside directors with government experience add value to their firms. We find that government directors are more likely to miss board meetings and that their appointment announcements are greeted more negatively. Firms with government directors also experience poorer...

Boards are crucial to shareholder wealth. Yet, little is known about how shareholder oversight affects director incentives. Using exogenous industry shocks to institutional investor portfolios, we find that institutional investor distraction weakens board oversight. Distracted institutions are...

We show that political polarization between directors and a CEO negatively impacts the effectiveness of corporate boards. At the director level, polarization increases directors’ incentive to monitor the CEO but creates a hostile board environment and discourages moderate directors’ board...