We consider a moral hazard issue inherent in the equity auctions of assets such as oil & gas leases and corporate takeovers. After the auction, the winning bidder decides whether to make follow-up investments in the acquired asset and makes the equity payment out of the revenue from it according...

We study the optimal selling mechanism and information disclosure policy for a house seller. The seller can select any selling mechanism, including an auction, and release additional information about the house to buyers. Release of information adjusts the buyers' values and bids. We find that...

The outcome of non-binding reverse auctions critically depends on how information is distributed during the bidding process. We use data from a large European procurement platform to study the impact of different information structures, specifically the availability of quality information to the...

I study a sequential first-price auction where two items are sold to two bidders with private binary valuations. A seller, prior to the second auction, can publicly disclose some information about the outcome of the first auction. I characterize equilibrium strategies for various disclosure...

This paper examines the effects of disclosing the actual number of bidders in contests with endogenous stochastic entry. I study a standard all-pay auction in which bidders' valuations are commonly known but their participation decisions private. Each potential bidder has to incur an entry cost...

We examine the effect of publicly disclosing or concealing bidders' types in an all-pay auction with a common bid cap. We call partial (full) disclosure policy the setup where the contest designer's disclosure policy is (not) contingent on type realization. Despite a bid cap possibly increasing...

This paper investigates whether a contest organizer should disclose private information about bidders' abilities in an all-pay auction. Bidders' abilities are affiliated through an underlying state of the world and are accessible by the contest organizer. The organizer decides whether to...

We analyze information disclosure as a policy instrument for contagion management indecentralized environments. A benevolent planner (e.g., the government) tests a fraction ofthe population to learn the infection rate. Individuals meet randomly and exert vigilanceeffort. Efforts factor in a...

We study all-pay auctions with private and affiliated binary values. To increase revenue (i.e., expected aggregate bid), the auction organizer can commit ex ante to fully disclosing or concealing bidders’ valuations. We find that full disclosure, as opposed to full concealment, always...