We offer that, when regulators require firms to obtain stakeholder approval of a corporate decision through voting on a resolution, firms disclose additional information that is needed for stakeholders to understand the optimal nature of the proposal and to vote in favor of it. We suggest that...

We show that the 2004 SEC regulation requiring more frequent disclosures from active mutual funds unintendedly increased the profitability of trading by another set of informed investors, namely insiders. Cross-sectional analyses suggest that this increase in insiders' profits is due to mutual...

We examine the 'confirmation' hypothesis that audited financial reporting and disclosure of managers' private information are complements, because independent verification of outcomes disciplines and hence enhances disclosure credibility. Committing to higher audit fees (a measure of financial...

We examine the “confirmation” hypothesis, that audited, backward-looking financial outcomes and disclosure of managers' private forward-looking information are complements, because independent audit disciplines and hence enhances disclosure credibility. Committing to higher audit fees (a...