In this study, we examine whether CEOs' stock-based compensation has any relationship with the disclosure of highly proprietary information. While prior studies suggest that stock-based compensation provides managers with an incentive to enhance their voluntary disclosures in general, we argue...

We investigate the extent to which market participants use compensation payouts released in the DEF 14A proxy statement (DEF14A) to assess future firm performance by examining sell-side analysts' earnings forecasts. Consistent with prior work, we confirm that CEO compensation unexplained by...

We investigate the extent to which market participants use compensation payouts released in the DEF 14A proxy statement (DEF14A) to assess future firm performance by examining sell-side analysts' earnings forecasts. Consistent with prior work, we confirm that CEO compensation unexplained by...

Using the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), we examine whether an exogenously imposed disclosure reform that increases the amount of information affects the level of executive compensation. Extant theories suggest that disclosure reforms could either raise...

We document negative stock returns and elevated trading volumes around executives' early option exercise disclosures post-SOX but not pre-SOX. This stock price reaction is incomplete, and the negative stock price drift is smaller post-SOX compared to pre-SOX. We also show effects of media...

In this paper, we examine the effect of managers' pay duration on firms' voluntary disclosures. Pay duration refers to the average period that it takes for managers' annual compensation to vest. We hypothesize and find that pay duration can incentivize managers to provide more bad news earnings...

While the social and economic impacts of how disclosures are presented are well-understood, it is less clear how disclosure decisions unfold throughout the annual reporting cycle. We study this issue by exploring the experience of interpreting and implementing corporate reporting rules, focusing...

Insiders have private information and often disclose non-GAAP earnings metrics with the claim that such metrics inform investors about earnings persistence. However, because insiders have private information about earnings persistence, they have opportunities to take advantage of this...

We examine factors influencing firms' strategic disclosure of executive pay in Korea. Because the disclosure rules in Korea do not mandate but only recommend that firms distinguish between inside executive directors and outside directors when reporting the average pay of directors, this...

We examine whether greater transparency leads to improved evaluation and rewarding of management. We posit that disclosure improves board effectiveness at monitoring executives and in strengthening the link between pay and performance. We use management guidance as our empirical proxy for...