We show that the commonly observed correlation between institutional investor ownership and the success of mergers is partly driven by active stock picking. Several mutual fund stock selection skill measures strongly predict the post-merger performance of corporate acquirers even after...

corporate governance can be viewed as a consequence of the pension industry reorganisation which occured in the 1970s and 1980s in so far as corporate governance borrows the same organisational principles.

We provide a theoretical model to explain the procyclicality of hedge fund activism. In our model, hedge funds which compete to retain investor flows excessively increase the net leverage of target firms in order to deliver high short-term payouts and signal their ability. Such excessive...

We study the link between a firm's quality of governance and its alliance activity. We consider alliances as a commitment technology that helps a company’ Chief Executive Officer overcome agency problems that relate to the inability to ex ante motivate division managers. We show that...

This study provides new insight on the impact of supervisory board structure as an internal governance mechanism on privately defined contribution pension fund performance in Poland. Using a hand-collected data set, we find evidence that the chairman, as a motivated insider, plays an important...

Using Morningstar mutual fund stewardship grade data, we find that the governance mechanisms of mutual funds play a key role in their monitoring of portfolio firms and in their investment decisions. Mutual funds with better governance practices tend to vote responsibly on corporate governance...

This paper provides benchmarks for monitoring costs and evaluates the net returns to shareholder activism. I model activism as a sequential decision process consisting of demand negotiations, board representation, and proxy contest and estimate the costs of each activism stage. A campaign ending...

Why is poor governance pervasive in the mutual fund industry? Researchers, practitioners and regulators have attributed this failing to a lack of director independence from fund management. This paper proposes an alternate explanation: fund governance is contagious. Fund directors act as...

In this paper we provide evidence that the post-issue accounting profitability of firms underwritten by bank affiliated underwriters that are also borrowers from the same bank in the IPO (Initial Public Offerings) year is significantly better than average, but that the stock price performance of...

le gouvernement d'entreprise peut être considéré comme un descendant de la réorganisation de l'industrie de la gestion collective car il en hérite les principes d'organisation.