This paper provides a two steps investigation of the literature on banking corporate governance. We firstly perform a systematic literature review on the academics papers focused on risk management, compensation and ownership structure of banks. Then we run a meta-analysis investigation over...

We investigate whether corporate governance is related to insolvency risk of financial institutions. Using a large sample of U.S. financial institutions over the 2005–2010 period, we find that corporate governance is positively related with insolvency risk of financial institutions as proxied...

Using a comprehensive corporate governance data set and machine learning techniques, specifically Neural Networks, I validate a significant effect and out of sample predictability of governance for corporate bond yield to maturity, which is the most important discount factor for bond valuations....

Minority shareholdings have been on the regulatory agenda of competition authorities for some time. Recent empirical studies, however, draw attention to a new, thought provoking theory of harm: common ownership by institutional investors holding small, parallel equity positions in several...

Among the main issues surround corporate governance in Islamic banking is that dealing with the role of Sharī'ah Supervisory Boards (SSB). The role of the SSB is particularly important before the launching of any new Islamic banking product and in making strategic decisions. Therefore, in...

We report on the current state and important older findings of empirical studies on corporate credit ratings and their relationship to ratings of other entities. Specifically, we consider the results of three lines of research: The correlation of credit ratings and corporate default, the...

Horizontal shareholdings exist when a common set of investors own significant shares in corporations that are horizontal competitors in a product market. Economic models show that substantial horizontal shareholdings are likely to anticompetitively raise prices when the owned businesses compete...

We present a simple model of common ownership in which an investor chooses its stake in competing firms in light of the effects on firm behavior and firm profits. Two firms compete in Cournot duopoly, and ownership affects a firm’s objective function in the manner posited by Bresnahan & Salop...

Using a large sample of Chinese firms, we examine performance differences between firms with female and male chairs and the channels through which such differences arise. After controlling for the presence of female CEOs and non-chair female directors, we find that chairwoman firms perform...