Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 6,592
Cover Image
Shareholders Should Welcome Employees as Directors
Osterloh, Margit; Frey, Bruno S. - 2005
The most influential theory of corporate governance, principal agency theory, does not take into consideration that the key task of modern corporations is to generate and transfer firm-specific knowledge. It proposes that, in order to overcome the widespread corporate scandals, the interests of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028422
Cover Image
Executive compensation, firm performance, and corporate governance in China : evidence from firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges
Kato, Takao (contributor); Long, Cheryl (contributor) - 2005
managers and thus possibly making China's listed firms less effective in solving the agency problem. As such, ownership …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003225948
Cover Image
Executive compensation, firm performance, and chaebols in Korea : evidence from new panel data
Kato, Takao (contributor); Kim, U-chʾan (contributor);  … - 2005
This paper provides the first rigorous econometric estimates on the pay-performance relations for executives of Korean firms with and without Chaebol affiliation. To do so, we have assembled for the first time panel data (that provide information not only on executive compensation and firm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003225965
Cover Image
The Relation between Public Managers’ Compensation and Governance
Coccia, Mario - 2018
senior managers. However, the institutional factors associated with high levels of compensation of public managers are hardly … known. In particular, studies about the possible relation between factors of governance and compensation of public managers … insights for general reforms of governance aimed to support equitably levels of compensation of public managers and efficiency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012924133
Cover Image
Executive Compensation and Regulation Imposed Governance : Evidence from the California Nonprofit Integrity Act (2004)
Dhole, Sandip - 2015
This study examines the impact of the California Nonprofit Integrity Act (2004) on CEO compensation costs in affected organizations. Contrary to the stated objective of the Act that executive compensation be “just and reasonable,” we find that CEO compensation costs for affected nonprofits...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013031620
Cover Image
Striking Oil in the Boardroom : Overpaying Executives through Manipulating Performance Metrics
Atanasov, Vladimir A. - 2020
suggest that managers can routinely manipulate performance metrics in order to increase their performance-based compensation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012832494
Cover Image
Compensation consultants and the level, composition, and complexity of CEO pay
Murphy, Kevin James; Sandino, Tatiana - 2017
consultants have higher-paid CEOs—this result is robust to firm fixed-effects and matching on economic and governance variables …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011901860
Cover Image
Chapter 4. Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There
Murphy, Kevin J. - 2013
In this study, I summarize the current state of executive compensation, discuss measurement and incentive issues, document recent trends in executive pay in both U.S. and international firms, and analyze the evolution of executive pay over the past century. Most recent analyses of executive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025560
Cover Image
Shareholder activists and frictions in the CEO labor market
Keusch, Thomas - 2021
Using hand-collected data on CEO appointments during shareholder activism campaigns, this study examines whether shareholder involvement in CEO recruiting affects frictions in CEO hiring decisions. The results indicate that appointments of CEOs who are recruited with shareholder activist...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012668370
Cover Image
The effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on CEO pay for luck
Paligorova, Teodora (contributor) - 2008
According to the rent-extraction hypothesis, weak corporate governance allows entrenched CEOs to capture the pay-setting process and benefit from events outside of their controlget paid for luck. In this paper, I find that the independence requirement imposed on boards of directors by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003721284