Shareholder activism is an important source of corporate governance. Using a dynamic regression discontinuity design on shareholder proposals that pass or fail by a small margin of votes in shareholder meetings, we analyze the effect of shareholder-initiated corporate governance on earnings...

We use a natural experiment to weigh conflicting theories on the causal impact of shareholder litigation threat on the readability of corporate financial disclosures. In response to a 1999 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that caused an unexpected reduction in litigation risk, we find that...

Corporate governance and firm disclosure are endogenously determined. We exploit locally exogenous variations in corporate governance created by "close-call" governance-related shareholder proposals, using a fuzzy RDD and the techniques developed in text analytics to examine whether better...

An integral aspect of shareholder democracy is the shareholder proposal process, through which shareholders can pressure firms to make changes. We find that shareholders' uncertainty about the firm reduces their participation in voting on shareholder proposals and also reduces the likelihood of...

While there is widespread concern that target CEO retention by a private equity acquirer can result in a lower premium for target shareholders because of the potential conflict of interest of the CEO, it is also possible that target shareholders could benefit from CEO retention because it can...