Directors are not one-dimensional. We characterize their skill sets by exploiting Regulation S-K's 2009 requirement that U.S. firms must disclose the experience, qualifications, attributes or skills that led the nominating committee to choose an individual as a director. We then examine how...

In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission eliminated uninstructed broker voting in director elections. We observe that average director approval rates remain high after the change in regulation, while the probability of a director being voted off the board remains low. Using event study...

We use exogenous changes in the probability that firms adopt executive ownership guidelines (EOGs) to measure the influence of board connections on the spreading of executive compensation policy. EOGs require managers to hold pre-specified equity ownership levels, and their use has increased...

We propose that potential entrants learn about industry conditions from observing the investment behavior of established firms. Strong corporate governance at established firms facilitates learning spillovers. Empirically, we find that industries experience more entry if incumbent firms invest...

We examine the wealth effects of the SEC's recent proxy access rule to facilitate director nominations by shareholders. We focus on how a firm's governance characteristics affect the market reaction to the rule. We find more negative announcement effects for firms with high probabilities of...