Using a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect.  When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms...

Monitoring corruption typically relies on top-down interventions aimed at increasing the probability of external controls and the severity of punishment.  An alternative approach to fighting corruption is to induce bottom-up pressure for reform.  Recent studies have shown that both top-down...

We study in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in a multiplayer dictator game.  An allocator divides a large sum of money among three groups of 20 recipients each and Self.  Allocations to groups are divided equally among the group members.  The three groups are supporters of the...

Democracy and media freedom have been suggested as useful tools in the fight against political corruption, but so far their interplay in this fight has received scant attention. We present a game theoretic model which predicts that the corruption-reducing effect of democracy becomes stronger as...

Why do some people choose corruption over honesty and others not?  Do the social norms and values prevailing in the societies in which they grew up affect their decisions?  In 2005, we conducted a bribery experiment and found that, among undergraduates, we could predict who would act corruptly...

Using a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evience of a negative externality effect and a framing effect.  When the losses suffered by a third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are increased bribes are less likely to be offered and accepted.  And when the game is presented...

This paper investigates the interaction between corruption and infrastructure policy reforms.  I construct a simple model to illustrate how both an incerase in regulatory autonomy and privatisation may influence the effect of corruption.  This interaction is then analysed empirically using a...

Insufficient attention has been paid to understanding what determines the performance of health workers and how they make labor market choices. This paper reports on findings from focus group discussions with both health workers and users of health services in Ethiopia, a country with some of...

The single-agent smash and grab problem take the form Max_xU(x).h(x). The agent selects a target value (how much to grab). The probability that he will receive (get away with) x is h(x), the cumulative probability distribution of the maximum achievable level of x. Generalizations are developed...

Many variables have been proposed by past studies as significant determinants of corruption. This paper asks if their estimated impact on corruption is robust to alteration of the information set. A Global Sensitivity Analysis, based on the Leamer`s Extreme-Bounds Analysis give a clear answer:...