The present paper is part of unpublished book divided into three interrelated manuscripts that analyze the collapse of the Sudan. The theory introduced here is that the regime was built on kleptocratic framework. That enhanced a rapid transformation of the values' system of the country and...

We study in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in a multiplayer dictator game.  An allocator divides a large sum of money among three groups of 20 recipients each and Self.  Allocations to groups are divided equally among the group members.  The three groups are supporters of the...

In the following article, we estimate the value of Patent Applications-PA in the context of the Environmental, Social and Governance-ESG model at world level. We use data from World Bank for 193 countries in the period 2011-2021. We found that PA is positively associated, among others, to “ CO...

In this Chapter is to give an overview of the relevant literature that also provides the necessary starting point to investigate the relationship mentioned above between policy decisions and corruption. Then in section 3.3 we examine briefly what motivates agents to engage in activities that we...

In this article we estimate the level of Control of Corruption for 193 countries in the period 2011-2020 using data from the ESG World Bank Database. Various econometric techniques are applied i.e.: Panel Data with Random Effects, Panel Data with Fixed Effects, Pooled OLS, WLS. Results show that...

We develop a new experiment to study the emergence of welfare-reducing bilateral alliances within larger groups, and the effectiveness of institutional interventions to curtail this reciprocal alliance behaviour. In each of the 25 rounds of our experiments, a player (the 'allocator') nominates...

In the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of vote-buying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shares. Voters either care about their individual votes, or about the policy outcome....

When property rights are poorly secured, crony relations i.e. the tight connection between the owners of major firms and the government are the primary informal mechanism securing the property. However, this institutional framework creates high entry barriers on markets. We propose a theory that...

We investigate experimentally the effects of corrupt experts on information aggregation in committees. We find that non-experts are significantly less likely to delegate through abstention when there is a probability that experts are corrupt. Such decreased abstention when the probability of...

Why do committees exist? The extant literature emphasizes that they pool dispersed information across members. In this paper, we argue that they may also serve to discourage outside influence or capture by raising its cost. As such, committees may contain members who add no new information to...