Showing 1 - 10 of 12
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003522378
The Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB; 2013, EEL) debate on 'the effect of foreign aid on corruption' has had an important influence in policy and academic circles. This paper provides a unifying framework by using investment and fiscal behavior transmission channels in 53 African...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409264
The debate by Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB; 2013, EEL) on 'the effect of foreign aid on corruption' in its current state has the shortcoming of modeling corruption as a direct effect of development assistance. This note extends the debate by assessing the channels of foreign aid...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409980
The Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB; 2013, EEL) debate on ‘the effect of foreign aid on corruption' has had an important influence in policy and academic circles. This paper provides a unifying framework by using investment and fiscal behavior transmission channels in 53 African...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047703
The debate by Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB; 2013, EEL) on ‘the effect of foreign aid on corruption' in its current state has the shortcoming of modeling corruption as a direct effect of development assistance. This note extends the debate by assessing the channels of foreign...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013032534
Under Principal-Agent-Supervisor paradigm, we examine in this paper how a tax collection agency changes optimal schemes in order to lessen the occurrence of corruption between the tax collector and the taxpayer. Indeed, the Principal, who maximizes the expected net fiscal revenue, reacts by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010840484
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013424117
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005705270
Using the principal-agent- supervisor paradigm, this paper examines the occurrence of collusion in a setting where the principal has no information about the supervisor and the agent does not necessarily know the supervisor’s preferences. We formally prove the occurrence of collusion is more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005027124
Under Principal-Agent-Supervisor paradigm, we examine in this paper how a tax collection agency changes optimal schemes in order to lessen the occurrence of corruption between the tax collector and the taxpayer. The Principal, who maximizes the expected net fiscal revenue, reacts by decreasing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108871