Monitoring corruption typically relies on top-down interventions aimed at increasing the probability of external … accountable.  This paper investigates the effectiveness of an accountability system that combines bottom-up monitoring and top … bribes under: 1) no monitoring; 2) conventional top-down auditing, and 3) an accountability system which gives citizens the …

In this paper, I analyze the effects of monitoring on an agent’s incentives in a two-period principal-agent model in … output; when she monitors the agent’s effort choice; and when she monitors the agent’s corruptibility. I find that monitoring … of effort improves the sorting of types but it might also give the agent more incentive to be corrupt. Monitoring of …

free-riding, which are often ignored in the literature. We derive the optimal monitoring mechanism and show that it solves … “assignment problem,” which, coupled with the need to generate incentive for monitoring, prevents the optimal monitoring mechanism … for the success of monitoring is whether monitors can be penalized for false reporting. Without this assumption monitoring …

detection and one without. It turns out that monitoring reduces corruption through deterrence; at the same time, it destroys the …

of monitoring a bureau. Following Mueller (1989), the bureau does not make take-it-or-leave-it budget proposals to the …