Across 69 countries, higher tax rates are associated with less unofficial activity as a percent of GDP but corruption is associated with more unofficial activity. Entrepreneurs go underground not to avoid official taxes but to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption. Dodging the Grabbing...

Across 69 countries, higher tax rates are associated with less unofficial activity as a percent of GDP but corruption is associated with more unofficial activity. Entrepreneurs go underground not to avoid official taxes but to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption. Dodging the Grabbing...

This paper aims to identify the determinants of revenue underreporting and their temporal evolution from a business perspective in formal firms located in an emerging country with high inflation (Argentina). We propose a conceptual model and we estimate it empirically using a logistic regression...

Although tax non-filing and the resulting tax evasion are a challenge to public welfare, particularly in developing countries, scholarly knowledge on taxable citizens who do not register as taxpayers, also known as the ‘ghosts’, is minimal. To expand this knowledge base, this empirical paper...

Although tax non-filing and the resulting tax evasion are a challenge to public welfare, particularly in developing countries, scholarly knowledge on taxable citizens who do not register as taxpayers, also known as the ‘ghosts', is minimal. To expand this knowledge base, this empirical paper...

This paper investigates whether corruption has contributed to the rise of the shadow economy in Uganda. Using autoregressive distributed lag bounds testing approach and granger causality econometric methods we find a positive relationship between corruption and the size of the shadow economy in...

This study used World Values Survey data to learn the attitude toward tax evasion of sample populations in the four BRIC countries – Brazil, Russia, India and China. The study found that more than 75 percent of the Chinese and Indian samples believed that tax evasion was never justifiable,...

We investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes taxpayers to blow the whistle on collusive corruption and tax compliance. We explore this through a formal leniency program. In our experiment, we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework. We not only...

We investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes taxpayers to blow the whistle on collusive corruption and tax compliance. We explore this through a formal leniency program. In our experiment, we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework. We not only...

We investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes taxpayers to blow the whistle on collusive corruption and tax compliance. We explore this through a formal leniency program. In our experiment, we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework. We not only...