In this paper we consider a family of cost allocation rules for which agents pay a share of their incremental cost as well as of any ‘debt’ from prior agents. This family encompasses the Bird rule and the free riding rule (where terminal agents pay everything) as the two extreme cases. By...

We examine a chain of sequential losses: an agent causes a loss to another, which triggers a loss to a third, and so forth. Our objective is to redistribute the losses fairly, taking into account that the chain turns "victim" to "injurer" in its subsequent step. This opens up for many...

When losses caused by one agent onto another triggers losses to a third, "victim" turns into "injurer" in the chain's subsequent steps. Should agents be responsible for the direct loss they cause or also bear some of the indirect losses they trigger? Through an axiomatic approach, we...

This paper considers allocation rules. First, we demonstrate that costs allocated by the Aumann-Shapley and the Friedman-Moulin cost allocation rules are easy to determine in practice using convex envelopment of registered cost data and parametric programming. Second, from the linear programming...

Risk capital allocation problems have been widely discussed in the academic literature. We consider a company with multiple subunits having individual portfolios. Hence, when portfolios of subunits are merged, a diversification benefit arises: the risk of the company as a whole is smaller than...