We generalize the analyses of Hazledine (2006, “Price discrimination in Cournot-Nash oligopoly”, Economics Letters) and Kutlu (2009, “Price discrimination in Stackelberg competition”, Journal of Industrial Economics) with asymmetric cost firms. We show that the main result of Hazledine,...

It is usually believed that higher competition, implying more active firms, benefits consumers and encourages the antitrust authorities to foster competition. We show that this view can be misleading, and higher competition may actually make the consumers worse-off. We suggest that the antitrust...

This paper studies the role of separation of ownership and management in determining the welfare implications of entry in oligopolistic markets. We show, in the presence of managerial incentive schemes with cost asymmetry, that entry is socially insufficient unless scale economies are very...

The literature analysing social efficiency of entry argues that entry is always socially excessive in industries with asymmetric cost firms and no scale economies. We show that exogenous cost asymmetry is responsible for this result. In a simple model with endogenous R&D investment by the more...