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The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - 2005

We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts "early" and a group of players who choose "late". Only the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003891850

The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - 2006

In the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with two groups of individual players who move sequentially, only the player with the lowest effort cost has a positive payoff. This payoff and the overall dissipation crucially depend on group composition. -- Sequential all-pay auction ; complete...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003892031

A market for connections

Miettinen, Topi; Poutvaara, Panu - 2012

Government or company decisions on whom to hire are mostly delegated to politicians, public sector officials or human resources and procurement managers. Due to anti-corruption laws, agents cannot sell contracts or positions that they are delegated to decide upon. Even if bribing is ruled out,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535107

Cost sharing in collective contests

Nitsan, Shemuʾel; Ueda, Kaoru - 2014

This paper studies collective contests with endogenous cost sharing, general effort costs and intra-group heterogeneity of prize-valuation. Our objective is to clarify the relationship between cost sharing, intra-group heterogeneity within the competing groups and the elasticity of the marginal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361507

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi; Herrmann, Benedikt; … - 2009

We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003799822

Evaluations : Hidden Costs, Questionable Benefits, and Superior Alternatives

Frey, Bruno S. - 2006

Research evaluation is praised as the symbol of modern quality management. We claim firstly, performance evaluations in research have higher costs than normally assumed, because the evaluated persons and institutions systematically change their behavior and develop counter strategies. Moreover,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012732960

Cost Sharing in Collective Contests

Nitzan, Shmuel - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013051619

Higher Costs Appeal to Voters : Implications of Expressive Voting

Clark, J. R. - 2016

The logic of expressive voting implies that some will find voting for a government policy more appealing the more costly it is. This result is consistent with public opinion polls and the trajectory of government spending. And it adds to the ability of rational voter ignorance and apathy to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012994737

Is Information Power? Using Mobile Phones and Free Newspapers During an Election in Mozambique

Aker, Jenny C.; Collier, Paul; Vicente, Pedro C. - 2022

participation were randomized; an SMS-based information campaign, an SMS hotline for electoral misconduct, and the distribution of a … survey data. We find positive effects of all treatments on voter turnout. We observe that the distribution of the newspaper … led to more accountability-based participation and to a decrease in electoral problems …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013291991

Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict

Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2015

Conflict and competition often impose costs on both winners and losers, and conflicting parties may prefer to resolve the dispute before it occurs. The equilibrium of a conflict game with side-payments predicts that with binding offers, proposers make and responders accept side-payments,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013037242

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