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Evaluations : Hidden Costs, Questionable Benefits, and Superior Alternatives

Frey, Bruno S. - 2006

Research evaluation is praised as the symbol of modern quality management. We claim firstly, performance evaluations in research have higher costs than normally assumed, because the evaluated persons and institutions systematically change their behavior and develop counter strategies. Moreover,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012732960

Asymmetric Policies. Pandering and State-specific Costs of Mismatch in Political Agency

Merzoni, Guido - 2020

We study the implications of state dependent costs of policy mismatch in political agency models where politicians have reputational concerns over their preferences and the "good'' politician shares the same objectives of the voters. We find that state-dependent costs can make pandering...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012823072

Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict

Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2015

Conflict and competition often impose costs on both winners and losers, and conflicting parties may prefer to resolve the dispute before it occurs. The equilibrium of a conflict game with side-payments predicts that with binding offers, proposers make and responders accept side-payments,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013037242

Higher Costs Appeal to Voters : Implications of Expressive Voting

Clark, J. R. - 2016

The logic of expressive voting implies that some will find voting for a government policy more appealing the more costly it is. This result is consistent with public opinion polls and the trajectory of government spending. And it adds to the ability of rational voter ignorance and apathy to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012994737

Campaign Cost and Electoral Accountability

Prato, Carlo - 2018

The increasing cost of campaigns and its implications for the performance of the electoral process are issues of paramount importance in modern democracies. We propose a theory of electoral accountability where candidates choose whether to propose a socially beneficial policy and whether to pay...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938658

Cost Sharing in Collective Contests

Nitzan, Shmuel - 2014

This paper studies collective contests with endogenous cost sharing, general effort costs and intra-group heterogeneity of prize-valuation. Our objective is to clarify the relationship between cost sharing, intra-group heterogeneity within the competing groups and the elasticity of the marginal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013051619

A Market for Connections

Miettinen, Topi - 2012

Government or company decisions on whom to hire are mostly delegated to politicians, public sector officials or human resources and procurement managers. Due to anti-corruption laws, agents cannot sell contracts or positions that they are delegated to decide upon. Even if bribing is ruled out,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013106547

Is Information Power? Using Mobile Phones and Free Newspapers During an Election in Mozambique

Aker, Jenny C.; Collier, Paul; Vicente, Pedro C. - 2022

participation were randomized; an SMS-based information campaign, an SMS hotline for electoral misconduct, and the distribution of a … survey data. We find positive effects of all treatments on voter turnout. We observe that the distribution of the newspaper … led to more accountability-based participation and to a decrease in electoral problems …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013291991

Moral Cost, Commitment, and Committee Size

Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A. - 2011

Consider a committee that in the past has made a promise not confiscate the profits from a foreign investor. After the investment has taken place, there is a material benefit if the committee decides to default on the earlier promise. But there are also some small moral costs for those who vote...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014073310

The Generalized Stackelberg Equilibrium of the All-Pay Auction with Complete Information

Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - 2021

We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts 'early' and a group of players who choose 'late.' Only the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318118