Consider G = (X1,…,XM,g1,…,gM) an M-player game in strategic form, where the set Xi is an interval of real numbers and the payoff functions gi are differentiable with respect to the related variable xi ∈ Xi. If they are also concave, with respect to the related variable, then it is...

In this paper, we examine whether farsighted players form the efficient grand coalition structure in coalition formation games. We propose a stability concept for a coalition structure, called sequentially stability, when only bilateral mergers of two separate coalitions are feasible because of...

If an aggregative game satisfies the generalized Hahn conditions, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium which may not be interior and is globally asymptotically stable under two alternative continuous adjustment processes with non-negativity constraints.

Profit-maximizing firms hedge risk from uncertainty by deciding on capacity investment and production. Typically, risk-averse firms monotonically forgo expected profit in exchange for an improved risk measure, e.g., conditional value-at-risk (CVaR). However, the stochastic-equilibrium literature...

This paper studies an effect of a horizontal merger where a product consolidation by the merged firm may alter the substitutability in the industry. We show that as the number of firms in the industry increases, this type of merger becomes profitable for merging firms, while unprofitable for...

This paper studies the stability of mergers between firms in a Cournot market. Unlike most existing works, we consider a demand structure where the substitutability between firms is asymmetric. We specifically focus on the stability of the grand coalition by analyzing the core allocation. The...

This paper studies an effect of a horizontal merger where a product consolidation by the merged firm may alter the substitutability in the industry. We show that as the number of firms in the industry increases, this type of merger becomes profitable for merging firms, while unprofitable for...