This note develops a method of recovering individual preferences, and of obtaining money-metricindividual welfare comparisons, from demand functions generated by Cournot-Nash equilibria ingames with public goods.

Marginal propensity to consume food out of food stamps in the US is higher than that out ofcash income. We explain this in terms of differential impact of cash income and in-kindtransfers on intra-household division of cash. We develop a Cournot model of a multi-personhousehold where food...

We examine the implications of an income redistribution from men to women for the welfare ofmothers and their children. We develop a Cournot model of a two-person household whereagents provide market labor and allocate their spending between a private consumption good andgoods for children. We...

We show the effects of Bertrand and Cournot competition on R&D investmentand social welfare in a duopoly with R&D competition where success in R&D isprobabilistic. We show that R&D investments are higher under Bertrand (Cournot)competition when R&D productivities are sufficiently low (high), and...

We show the welfare effects of entry in presence of technology licensingunder Cournot competition. If the entrant is technologically inferior to that of theincumbent then, though licensing reduces (or completely eliminates) excessive entryfor relatively low entry costs, it creates excessive...

The paper shows that there is a close connection between (constant)consistent conjectures in a given game and evolutionary stabilityof conjectures. Evolutionarily stable conjectures are consistent andconsistent conjectures are the only interior candidates for evolutionarystability...

This paper re-considers the comparison of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiatedduopoly with linear demand and cost functions. It focuses on the case of substitutegoods, and allows for cost asymmetries between firms. The main finding is that, when thedegree of cost asymmetry is...

This paper examines the validity of alternative assumptions aboutpublic enterprise strategies in the presence of both domestic and internationalcompetition. It extends the quantity-setting game to apreplay stage and endogenizes the firms’ order of moves to show thati) Cournot competition is...

This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a horizontallydifferentiated duopoly market with non-tournament R&D competition. We consider thatsuccess in R&D is uncertain. We show that whether firms invest more under Cournotcompetition or Bertrand competition is ambiguous and depends on...

This paper shows the possibility of higher welfare under Cournot competitionin an asymmetric cost duopoly when the firms have the option for technology licensing.We find that if there is licensing with up-front fixed-fee, welfare is higher under Cournotcompetition compared to Bertrand...