We study the optimal design of a disinflation plan by a planner who lacks commitment. Having announced a plan, the Central banker faces a tradeoff between surprise inflation and building reputation, defined as the private sector's belief that the Central bank is committed to the plan. Some plans...

In diesem Aufsatz untersuchen wir, warum Staaten Anreize haben, Umweltverschmutzung zu besteuern anstatt Umweltverschmutzungsrechte zu veräußern. Unser Modell berücksichtigt, dass Regierungen sowohl umweltpolitische Ziele als auch fiskalische oder industriepolitische Motive haben können. Wir...

Central banks have been made more independent in many countries. A common rationale has been the existence of a credibility (or lack-of-trust) problem for monetary policy. This indicates a possible and until now unexplored link between social trust and central-bank independence. Our empirical...