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A model of dynamic risk-sharing is constructed where agents meet pairwise and at random, and there is private information about endowments. Risk sharing is accomplished through dynamic contracts involving credit transactions, and through monetary exchange. A Friedman rule is optimal, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755377
We construct a dynamic heterogeneous-agent model with random uninsurable endowments. Two allocation mechanisms are considered, one with long-term complete credit arrangements under private information, and one with incomplete competitive markets. A role for money arises due to random limited...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005560382
We construct a model with private information in which consumers write dynamic contracts with financial intermediaries. A role for money arises due to random limited participation of consumers in the financial market. Without defection constraints, a Friedman rule is optimal, the mean and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566235