This paper explores the economic role credit rating agencies play in the corporate bond market. We consider three existing theories about multiple ratings: information production, rating shopping and regulatory certification. Using differences in rating composition, default prediction and credit...

I model direct competition between investor-paid and issuer-paid credit rating agencies (CRAs). Frictions in the form of issuer private benefits induce issuer-paid CRAs to inflate ratings. Investor-paid CRAs optimally generate more accurate ratings, leading to adverse selection for investors...

This paper explores the economic role credit rating agencies play in the corporate bond market. We consider three existing theories about multiple ratings: information production, rating shopping and regulatory certification. Using differences in rating composition, default prediction and credit...

This paper investigates the economic viability and welfare contribution of alternatives to issuer-paid credit rating agencies (CRAs). To this end, it introduces a heterogeneous competition model for lending and ratings markets. Frictions among issuers or investors induce rating inflation from...