Using Danish household level data, we find that a relatively large share of total interest-only mortgage debt is held by families with few liquid assets and high loan to value ratios. This may arise because families with interest-only loans do not fully use the lower instalments to increase...

We examine the closeness of relationships between households and their mortgage lenders using survey data which provide information on the duration, geographical proximity and scope of all bank relationships of a representative sample of households. Our analysis is based on a sample of 470...

The new forward-looking credit loss provisioning standard, CECL, is intended to promote proactive provisioning as loan loss reserves can be conditioned on expectations of the economic cycle. We study the degree to which one modeling decision–expectations about the path of future house...

In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, a significant research effort has been made to better understand the links between household debt levels, financial stability risks, and the ongoing implications of the ‘debt overhang’ for economic growth. However, accurately measuring the...

The authors examine the effect of a trade-off between shared credit risk and liquidity efficiency, among participants in Tranche 2 of the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS T2), on their decisions to leave open, or close, their bilateral credit limits (BCLs) to a participant at risk of imminent...

A string of theoretical papers shows that the non-exclusivity of credit contracts generates important negative contractual externalities. Employing a unique dataset, we identify how these externalities affect the supply of credit. Using internal information on a creditor's willingness to lend,...

We offer a theoretical framework to analyze corporate lending when loan officers must be incentivized to prospect for loans and to transmit the soft information they obtain in that process. We explore how this multi-task agency problem shapes loan officers' compensation, banks' use of soft...

We offer a theoretical framework to analyze corporate lending when loan officers must be incentivized to prospect for loans and to transmit the soft information they obtain in that process. We explore how this multi-task agency problem shapes loan officers' compensation, banks' use of soft...

We demonstrate theoretically and empirically the presence of forbearance lending by profit-maximizing banks to influential buyers in a supply network. If the financial market is concentrated, then banks can internalize the negative externality of an influential firm's exit. As a result, they may...