This paper extends the existing literature on deposit insurance by proposing a new approach for the estimation of the loss distribution of a Deposit Insurance Scheme (DIS) that is based on the Basel 2 regulatory framework. In particular, we generate the distribution of banks’ losses following...

On 3 December EY hosted a SUERF conference on banking reform with Sir Howard Davies, the Chairman of RBS, and Dame Colette Bowe, the Chairman of the Banking Standards Board, as the two keynote speakers. Professor David Miles (Imperial College) gave the SUERF 2015 Annual Lecture on Capital and...

Combining deposit taking with credit line provision saves on the liquidity costs banks incur to meet the liquidity needs of consumers and corporations, but it exposes them to a risk of concurrent runs on their assets and liabilities. If a bank's financial condition deteriorates, depositors have...

We examine the effectiveness of bank regulation in the light of creditor diversity. Our theory suggests a bank can increase its value by matching the riskiness of its securities and the risk tolerance of its diverse creditors. Even a well-capitalized bank might not eliminate financial fragility...

This study shows how the misconception of the option value of deposit insurance by Merton (1977) and its later misuse by Keeley and Furlong (1990), among others, have led some literature supporting the adoption of binding non-risk-based capital requirements to derive incorrect conclusions about...

With a sample of twelve US bond indices spanning different maturities, credit ratings and industry sectors, we investigate the impact of new bank capital regulation for trading portfolios introduced by Basel III. Specifically, we estimate the new capital requirements for (a) liquidity risk and...

By employing Moody‘s corporate default and rating transition data spanning the last 90 years we explore how much capital banks should hold against their corporate loan portfolios to withstand historical stress scenarios. Specifically, we shall focus on the worst case scenario over the...

This paper illustrates channels by which regulations that require banks to hold liquid assets can either increase or decrease a bank's incentive to take risk with its remaining ineligible assets. A greater capacity to respond to liquidity stress increases the potential profits a bank would put...

This study investigates whether banks and insurance corporations perform regulatory arbitrage by buying bonds with inflated credit ratings. We argue that credit rating based capital requirements incentivize banks and insurance corporations to hold more bonds with inflated credit ratings. We...