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"Keystone cops" meet "Pirates of the Somali coast" : the failure of international efforts to control maritime piracy

Hallwood, Paul; Miceli, Thomas J. - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009380567

Modern maritime piracy

Hallwood, Paul; Miceli, Thomas J. - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344313

On proportionality of punishments and the economic theory of crime

Miceli, Thomas J. - In: European journal of law and economics 46 (2018) 3, pp. 303-314

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012030876

The real puzzle of blackmail : an informational approach

Miceli, Thomas J. - In: Information economics and policy : IEP 23 (2011) 2, pp. 182-188

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009244361

The real puzzle of blackmail : an informational approach

Miceli, Thomas J. - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003987192

Expressive law and escalating penalties : accounting for the educational function of punishment

Miceli, Thomas J. - In: Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with … 19 (2023) 3, pp. 245-261

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014438878

Crime as exchange : comparing alternative economic theories of criminal justice

Miceli, Thomas J. - In: European journal of law and economics 51 (2021) 3, pp. 523-539

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012544322

Counting offenders' gains? : economic and moral considerations in the determination of criminality

Miceli, Thomas J. - In: European journal of law and economics 54 (2022) 3, pp. 475-496

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013431574

Of coase, cattle, and crime : why the Becker model is compatible with a moral theory of criminal law

Miceli, Thomas J. - In: Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with … 18 (2022) 2, pp. 179-198

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013554757

Marginal deterrence when offenders act sequentially

Friehe, Tim; Miceli, Thomas J. - In: Economics Letters 124 (2014) 3, pp. 523-525

Marginal deterrence concerns the incentives created by criminal penalties for offenders to refrain from committing more harmful acts. We show that when offenders act sequentially, it is often optimal for the level of the sanction, not just the expected sanction, to rise with the severity of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930727