We develop a model in which two countries choose their enforcement levels non-cooperatively, in order to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in their territory. We assume that crime is mobile, both ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and that criminals who hide...

Two countries set their enforcement non-cooperatively to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in their territory. Crime is mobile, ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and criminals hiding abroad after having com- mitted a crime in a country must be extradited back....

We test the rational economic model of marginal deterrence of law enforcement - i.e., the need for graduating the penalty to the severity of the crime. We combine individual-level data on sentence length for a representative sample of US inmates with proxies for maximum punishment and monitoring...

Two countries set their enforcement non-cooperatively to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in their territory. Crime is mobile, ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and criminals hiding abroad after having com- mitted a crime in a country must be extradited back....

We develop a model in which two countries choose their enforcement levels non-cooperatively, in order to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in their territory. We assume that crime is mobile, both ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and that criminals who hide...