We examine the optimal auditing problem of a tax authority when taxpayers can choose both to evade and avoid. For a convex penalty function the incentive-compatibility constraints may bind for the richest taxpayer and at a positive level of both evasion and avoidance. The audit function is...

This paper shows that stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion. Individuals vote on a linear income tax which is used to finance lump sum transfers. Stricter enforcement may make redistributive taxation more attractive to the decisive voter. The tax rate and transfer may rise which in turn...

The Norwegian Tax Administration operated multi-year random audits of personal income tax returns. We exploit this exceptional randomized setup to estimate the effects of tax audits on future compliance explicitly distinguishing between dynamic responses of compliant and noncompliant audited...

The paper is a summary of the exchange of knowledge and experience that took place in the course of the project "Mutual Learning for Reducing Tax Gaps in V4 Countries and Ukraine" co-financed by the Visegrad Fund in the years 2016-2017. Five institutions took part in the project: Center for...

The paper summarizes knowledge on tax gaps in Poland with respect to PIT, CIT, VAT, and excise. An introduction to the Polish tax system is given, trends in tax collect ability and estimates of the tax gaps are discussed, and methods of combating tax evasion and avoidance are reviewed. The paper...

The basic deterrence model of tax evasion is described, its main predictions are derived and limitations and flexibility are outlined. Further, the model is interpreted in light of some key institutional features characterising tax enforcement in OECD countries. Throughout the survey, findings...

We examine two Pakistani programs to see if the public disclosure of tax information and social recognition of top taxpayers promote tax compliance. Pakistan began revealing income tax paid by every taxpayer in the country from 2012. Simultaneously, another program began recognizing and...

In an environment with extensive corruption where much of the population evades paying their full taxes due, we tackle the question of optimal taxation when constituencies with opposing objectives (the poor and the rich) push tax policy in different directions. We think in terms of a government...

Two global initiatives are examples of the effective use of tax systems instruments to protect countries' tax sovereignty in a world of increasing globalization. These OECD/G20 initiatives will provide tax administration and policy researchers with valuable insights on taxpayer and government...

With (automatic) exchange of tax information among countries now common, tax evaders have had to find new ways to hide their offshore holdings. One such way are citizenship-by-investment programs, which offer foreigners a new passport for a local investment or a fixed fee. We show analytically...