We consider a world in which countries apply optimal taxes on mobile capital and savings (like in Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991). Firms and savers may underreport income in order to avoid or evade taxation. We show that, even in the presence of underreporting, the equilibrium under tax competition...

We explore the role of tax administrations in the fight against inequality through data analysis of a survey consisting of 71 questions that we have designed and sent to the tax administrations of all EU Member States. The survey focuses mainly on the capacity concerning the enforcement of tax...

Tax minimization strategies may lead to significant tax savings, which could, in turn, increase firm value. However, such strategies are also associated with significant costs, such as expected penalties and planning, agency, and reputation costs. The overall impact of firms' tax minimization...

This paper analyzes corporate tax evasion in a principal-agent model with multitasking. A firm-owner hires a specialist tax manager who chooses the quantity as well as the quality of tax evasion. Higher quality is a form of self-insurance and lowers the firm's expected fine for tax evasion. In...

The size of tax evasion and fraud appears to be increasing steadily in the EU. To a certain extent, the completion of Single Market has further encouraged firms and households evasive behaviour in paying value added taxes in the EU Member States, whereas such efforts have traditionally been most...

We model the interaction between the informal credit market and the act of tax collection by the government; in presence and functioning of the informal credit market, the agents (the tax paying firms) engage in false or sham litigation and deferred tax payments. During the litigation period...

This paper examines the compliance pattern of small businesses, using pooled 1985 and 1988 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) data. Specifically, we focus on the voluntary reporting compliance of income from proprietorship, farm, and rental real estate activities. We find that...

We model the interaction between the informal credit market and the act of tax collection by the government; in presence and functioning of the informal credit market, the agents (the tax paying firms) engage in false or sham litigation and deferred tax payments. During the litigation period...

Policymakers are struggling to accommodate cryptocurrencies within tax systems not designed to handle them; this paper reviews the issues that arise. The greatest challenges are for implementation: crypto's quasi-anonymity is an inherent obstacle to third-party reporting. Design problems arise...