We study environments where a production process is jointly shared by a finite group of agents. The social decision involves the determination of input contribution and output distribution. We define a competitive solution when there is decreasing returns-to-scale and show that it leads to a...

The paper questions the methodology of "economics and psychology". It focuses on the case of hyperbolic discounting. Using some experimental results, I argue that the same sort of evidence which rejects the standard constant discount utility functions can just as easily reject hyperbolic...

A decision maker faces a decision problem, or a game against nature. For each probability distribution over the state of the world (nature`s strategies), she has a weak order over her acts (pure strategies). We formulate conditions on these weak orders guaranteeing that they can be jointly...

This note provides an axiomatic derivation of a case-based decision rule. It shows that, if preferences orders over available acts in various contexts satisfy certain consistency requirements, then these orders can be numerically represented by maximizationof a similarity-weighted utility function.

We generalize the economic decision problem considered by Blackwell(1953) in which a decision maker chooses an action after observing a signal correlated to the state of nature. Unlike Blackwell's case where the feasible set is fixed, in our framework, the feasible set of actions depends on the...

Debates often serve as intitutions of mechanisms for resolving conflicts and making decisions. In this paper , we present a simple model in order to explain two phenomena concerning debate rules.

We classify the responses to owr paper " On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall" and address some of the points raised.

During contarctual negotiations, but before entering a contarct, parties might make reliance expenditures. Such expenditures would increase the surplus should a contarct be made, but would wasted if not. This paper analyses parties' decisions to invest in pre-contractual reliance under...

This paper argues that when organizations are imperfect in the sense that members may make mistakes and messages may be distorted, then the inner structure of the organization should be explicitly modeled. This paper proposes a framework for studying games between imperfect organizations.

The paper questions the methodology of "economics and psychology". It focuses on the case of hyperbolic discounting. Using some experimental results, I argue that the same sort of evidence which rejects the standard constant discount utility functions can just as easily reject hyperbolic...