In this paper, we examine the influence of information rigidities concerning the net worth of banks on the real economy over time. In a first part, we show empirically that expectations about the net earnings of banks (as growth of net worth) are truly biased, particularly during the financial...

In this paper, we discuss the consequences of imperfect information about financial frictions on the macroeconomy. We rely on a New Keynesian DSGE model with a banking sector in which we introduce imperfect information about a limited enforcement problem. Bank managers divert resources and can...

In this paper, we examine the influence of information rigidities concerning the net worth of banks on the real economy over time. In a first part, we show empirically that expectations about the net earnings of banks (as growth of net worth) are truly biased, particularly during the financial...

In this paper, we discuss the consequences of imperfect information about financial frictions on the macroeconomy. We rely on a New Keynesian DSGE model with a banking sector in which we introduce imperfect information about a limited enforcement problem. Bank managers divert resources and can...